Disbanding the Iraqi Army: An Assessment
By streiff Posted in War — Comments (20) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »
It has become de rigueur on the left to label every action associated with the Iraq war as “incompetent.” Mostly this is charming as it comes from the usual chorus of remarkably unlearned political hacks and unqualified military analysts that frequent the editorial pages of our newspapers. As an aside, I never ceased to be amazed at how an Ivy League degree, a tour in the Peace Corps, and good hair enables otherwise unqualified bozos to discourse on military strategy, but I digress.
In their campaign to paint Iraq as a failure many of the critics, some of whom should and do know better, have seized upon the disbanding of the Iraqi army and de-Ba’athification as two critical errors which set off the Sunni-based insurgency. Both actions were and remain imminently logical and prudent and a more serious discussion needs to accompany the post mortem on these decisions than the rather empty sloganeering to date.
Read on.
On May 23, 2003 Ambassador Paul Bremer ordered the dissolution of all components of the Iraqi military and intelligence services. At the time the decision was obvious. The armies of vanquished dictators are not usually called upon to serve the victors much less the new government. It followed the policy used by the US occupation authorities in Europe in 1945:
7. Demilitarization:
a. In your zone you will assure that all units of the German armed forces, including pare-military organizations, are dissolved as such, and that their personnel are promptly disarmed and controlled. Prior to their final disposition, you will arrest and hold all military personnel who are included under the provisions of paragraph 8.
b. The Control Council should proclaim, and in your zone you will effectuate, the total dissolution of all military and pare-military organizations, including the General Staff, the German Officers Corps, the Reserve Corps and military academies, together with all associations which might serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany.
c. You will seize or destroy all arms, ammunition and implements of war and stop the production thereof.
d. You will take proper steps to destroy the German war potential, as set forth elsewhere in this directive.
and the contribution Saddam’s army could be expected to make towards establishing a new Iraq was rightfully expected to be marginal given its loyalties and capabilities.
As early as November, 2003, retired Marine Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, a vocal opponent of the war, called the move the Bush administration's "worst mistake" in postwar Iraq. Others have echoed the call.
The critique of why some believe the disbanding of the Iraqi army was a mistake might be best summarized in Fred Kaplan’s tendentious Reckless or Clueless? Kaplan, I hasten to point out has neither an Ivy League degree nor did he serve in the Peace Corps but he did work for Les Aspin.
Michael Gordon has recently been trying to unravel some aspects of this mystery in the New York Times, and his account of what may be the administration's most catastrophic mistake—the decision to disband the Iraqi army in May 2003—suggests mindlessness was the culprit.
The decision—decreed by the U.S.-led occupation authority's "Order No. 2," titled "The Dissolution of Entities"—is now widely seen as a turning point in the post-battlefield phase of the war. Removing a potential force for order from an inherently chaotic landscape, the decision allowed looters to flourish and worsened matters by unleashing thousands of ticked-off Iraqi ex-soldiers who no longer had paychecks but still had their guns. The ensuing riots stretched the already-sparse "coalition" forces still thinner. Finally, the elimination of the army destroyed all shreds of the Iraqi people's hopes that their sovereignty might be preserved. Gordon quotes one U.S. colonel as saying of the disbanding, "We changed from being a liberator to an occupier with that single decision."
The most noxious part of this claim is the idea that disbanding of the Iraqi Army created a large number men without paychecks, who presumably turned to the insurgency to earn a living. The underlying accusation here is that the US created the insurgency.
This criticism is easily swatted down and Kaplan either knew it when he wrote article or should have known it… reckless or clueless?
Bremer’s order did cut off all members of the armed forces with a one time severance payment. However, there were demonstrations against this by large numbers of former soldiers. On June 23, 2003, Bremer rescinded that portion of his order and salaries resumed to all members of the regular army. Conscripts received their one-time severance payment and were released from service.
So there was and is no large body of former Iraqi soldiers who took to the insurgency, shades of Jean Valjean, to feed their starving families. The extent to which members of Saddam’s armed forces are participating in the insurgency is a function of something other than lacking a paycheck.
A second thread here is that disbanding the Iraqi army allowed looting to flourish. Looting, however, had subsided by the time Paul Bremer disbanded the Iraqi Army. Regardless, the Iraqi police were not disbanded nor were its border police or customs services. In particular, the looting of the al Qa’qaa depot, if it ever happened, which Kaplan trots out took place at least a month before Bremer arrived in Iraq and while there was still combat in Baghdad. He couldn’t be seriously proposing that we employ Iraqi troops for security while combat operations were underway? Could he?
The decision facing US forces during the Iraq war was a complex one. Based on our last experience with mass surrender, that of the German army in April/May 1945, there was a fear that the momentum of the drive on Baghdad would be halted by the sheer number of prisoners. Prisoners have to be escorted, guarded, fed, watered, and provided medical care. Dissolved units can be left to fend for themselves.
There was not a unitary Iraqi army in either organization or command structure. The regular Iraqi army was largely Shi’a conscripts. They were poorly trained and even more poorly armed and led. The US military knew from the Gulf War experience that this army would melt away given the chance. Given the choice between expending the resources to care for this mass of prisoners or allowing the units to disband and return home, the correct decision was made to let them go.
It was expected that the Republican Guard, the only professional component of Saddam’s army, would resist. And it did. A large number were killed and most of the remainder went into prisoner of war camps but more importantly the units ceased to exist.
It was also suspected that the armed thuggery that constituted the Special Republican Guard and the Saddam Fedayeen would resist. Again they did. Most were killed. The remainder went underground or into prisoner of war camps.
By May 1, 2003 when the US assumed responsibility as an occupying power under the Geneva Conventions there was no army left extant to use for any purpose.
Had a decision been made to reconstitute the only part of the army arguably interested in remaining on duty, the Republican Guard, a whole variety of new problems would have been created.
- The Republican Guard was widely resented and recalling it to duty to serve as the military face of the Coalition Provisional Authority would have served to alienate the Shi’a completely. It was the Republican Guard who put down the Shi’a rising in the summer of 1991. This would have been the equivalent of the US Army recalling the Waffen SS to enforce order during the Occupation.
- In addition to its association with Saddam, we would have created a situation where the guarantor of the successor government was composed of men who had demonstrated their loyalty to the previous regime and would be overwhelmingly Sunni and Ba’athist.
- Not only would the political loyalty of the army to the new regime be questionable, there is equally no guarantee that army would not be actively hostile to both the US forces and the new Iraqi government. Our experience in April 2004 of creating the “Falluja Brigade” to police Falluja from the ranks of former Iraqi Army troops proved to be nothing short of disastrous.
- Calling back into service substantial numbers of the former military establishment would have inevitably led to the employment of war criminals. Purging these men from power once they were employed by the new government would have been infinitely more difficult than sending them home and recalling them after vetting, as we have done. It would also have created a public relations debacle for the Administration.
- Given the rather improbable idea that a government of men who had spent years in exile or in resistance to Saddam would allow their army to be composed of Saddam loyalists, Bremer did the new government a favor by disbanding the army rather than putting off the purge by some months or a couple of years.
Conversely, while there were considerable disadvantages to keeping the Iraqi Army in existence there were few, if any, advantages.
Their loyalty was questionable and American units serving alongside them or individual Americans attached to them as advisors would have been in constant danger of betrayal.
The Soviet model of organization used by the Iraqis compounded by the stultifying fear of punishment in Saddam’s army had conspired to reduce the Iraqi Army to ineffectualness. In an insurgency they would be a liability, not an asset.
Mark Bowden, writing in the Wall Street Journal:
The old Saddam-era officers were both reluctant to assume responsibility and to share authority, so they resisted American efforts to train competent Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), the experienced sergeants who are the first line of command in today's military. Strong NCO leadership gives units in battle far greater flexibility to respond to unexpected situations and to demonstrate initiative. Under the Saddam model, authority is jealously guarded and reluctantly exercised. Decisions are passed up the chain of command by field officers unwilling to take risks. Maj. Lechner found that lower-ranking Iraqi officers in his battalion during battle were reluctant even to read a map--they preferred to wait for instructions about which way to go.
It has become generally accepted wisdom that it was a mistake for the Coalition Provisional Authority to disband Saddam's army after American forces took Baghdad two years ago. If Maj. Lechner's experience is typical, then retaining the old force would have just created a whole different set of problems, and might well have further set back efforts to create a flexible, effective Iraqi army. Solving the problem in the 7th Battalion ultimately required rooting out nearly all of those officers who had served under the old regime.
"Even officers from the old army who are trustworthy fail to have the skills necessary to conduct operations effectively and seemed unable to learn or apply instruction given to them," Maj. Lechner wrote. "The majority of the officers of the old army are ineffective at best and a true cancer at worst. The greatest success was achieved by placing proven junior officers in key positions and with officers who had not been members of the old army."
This story has been written over a period of months so I was surprised to find a very recent op-ed by Dan Senor and Walter Slocombe. Not surprisingly, they contend disbanding Saddam’s army was the right decision. More surprisingly is Mother Jones’ take:
Yesterday, Dan Senor and Walter Slocombe, two former CPA officials, wrote a New York Times op-ed defending the Bush administration's decision to disband the Iraqi army in early 2003. It's a bit like having Oliver North write an essay on why using Iran to sell arms to the Contras was actually a pretty clever scheme (oh, hell, it's a bit like hiring Oliver North as a commenter for your news network), but in this case, these two are probably right. Had the U.S. kept Saddam's old army in place in Iraq, it could have very easily alienated the Shiites and Kurds, and in that alternate universe, who knows what kind of insurgency the U.S. may be facing right now.
Mistakes and misjudgments are part of the Clausewitzian friction inherent in warfare. Every government in every war ever fought has made them. The only valid question is whether the mistake is of such strategic proportions that it affects the outcome. More importantly, disagreement with a decision does not make the decision a mistake.
The decision to disband the Iraqi army was not unanimous. Some in the military felt a compelling case could be made for keeping the army:
A former planner from General Franks's command strongly disagreed. "We wanted to rapidly call the soldiers back, get them on our side and then sort out who could and could not be trusted," said the planner, who did not want to be identified because he did want to be publicly caught up in the controversy. "It would have been a lot faster than building one battalion at a time. And we wanted to send a psychological message that they were going to be part of the new Iraq, to prevent them from turning against us."
But rarely are wartime decisions clean and easy:
"It made sense at first to say we are going to use them," Mr. Feith said. "When we saw that the Army did not remain in units, that the people disappeared, that looters had stripped all of the infrastructure, all of the various pros that weighed in favor of using the army had been negated by events. And we were left with the cons, a bad, corrupt, cruel and undemocratic army."
Retaining Saddam’s army would have strengthened the hand of the Ba’ath party, alienated 80% of the country, created an inevitable conflict between the army and the government all the while adding little to no combat capability.
Disbanding Saddam’s army was the correct decision at the time, politically and militarily, and it remains the correct decision today.
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analysis of a correct strategic decision. The implications of leaving a Sunni led military in place would have created armed militias representing 80% of the population, with us on the wrong side, demographically and historically. If I could add a link, check out W. Andrew Terril's monograph Strategic Implications of Intercommunal Warfare in Iraq here
I've seen the assesments of unit composition a thousand times at least. Saddam didn't let anyone near a gun unless they were known. A real "Good Ol' Boy" network. That is the bottom line of why they had to fight the Iranians to a standoff instead of making it to Tehran.
Demilitarization was, without a doubt, the proper thing to do.
is given substance by second guessing what differnce does it make what you second guess about ? Monday morning quarterbacking has been raised to a near science lately,intelligent recommendations having been in short supply during the course of actual events. It doesn't take a Frederick the Great to realize that you don't want a just defeated enemy at your back while you consolidate your position. More so in a country as tribally divisive and brutalized as Iraq. The best part of being a compulsive second guesser is that you are never wrong[ recognize anybody here?]. You could hear the wails on our alliance with the former torturers if we had done contrary to the actions taken,"what kind of nation have we become",for starters.
Like most times in life we can see the consequences of a choice made, but not the consequences of the alternative. We see a negative consequence of disbanding the army (there were some former Sunni officers that joined the resistance).
However we can't see the consequences of the alternative not taken. For example, if the Iraqi army had become a conduit for explosives to the insurgency, would the same voices be saying it was a great idea? I have no doubt that General Zinni would have been on TV today saying something like "The Bush Administration didn't learn the lessons of WWII -- you must disband the military force and remake it into a loyal, professional force." This whole issue sounds extremely opportunistic, as do several of the other criticisms.
A well-thought-out, complete argument such as this one here, is exactly what's needed to refute the "Bush lied" theme.
But, we will need more of it. LOTS more of it.
Those who push the "Bush lied" or "Bush is a fool" themes have the easy job. They simply reach into their kit bag and throw out accusations.
- Bush lied about yellowcake
- Bush hid key "exculpatory" intelligence about Iraq's WMD capability
- The Army and Marines allowed all the priceless treasures to be looted from the Baghdad museums
- The Jennifer Lynch rescue was simply a PR stunt, as she wasn't really in danger.
- Bush ignored the security of al Qaaa and countless other ammo dumps
- Initially trusting Iraqi troops to fight the first battle of Fallujah was on its face sheer US incompetence.
- Etc...etc...etc...
Some of these decisons turned out to be mistakes--Fallujah, for instance. But, to honest people doing their best to balance all competing concerns (military, diplomatic, PR, cultural sensitivity) as they pondered what to do in Fallujah, the option of trying to liberate the city with Iraqi troops seemed worth a shot. Yes, it turned out to be the wrong option. But it wasn't obviously the wrong option at the time it was chosen! It might have worked. It didn't, so we moved on to something else. This happens often in war, and in life.
But, if your goal as a Bush critic is simply to weaken his image, as the picador in a bullfight aims to weaken the bull, you don't need to make a clean kill. If someone refutes your allegation that, by how he handled Crisis #1, Bush proved himself to be a dastard or a dolt or both--well, no matter. You simply drop it, and raise allegations about how Bush handled Crisis #2, or 3, or 73.
The fact that you can count on the MSM to repeat, and rerepeat, and rerererepeat your allegations, with little or no question, helps your cause greatly. (Plus, Crisis #1 isn't lost to you forever as a PR weapon. When some time has passed, and people forget how your allegation got smacked down six months ago, you might be able to air it again, and get a bit more PR value from it. Especially if those who smacked you down the first time are occupied on some other matter.)
The benefits of this Picador Strategy are obvious. You weaken the bull, while keeping your distance. When the bull turns to face you, you skip away, or retreat from the ring together. Meanwhile, the bull gets weaker. And the picador has an endless supply of lances.
In today's media climate, with 24/7 news channels that need to fill airtime, and MSM reporters who'd only vote for a Republican at gunpoint, any allegation can be a lance. The topic of the Iraq War offers an endless supply of questions and concerns, most of which can be fashioned into lances. So what if only 10% of all the lances (charges) you throw actually stick and draw blood? If you can throw a hundred lances, over time the amount of blood you can draw from ten separate wounds adds up.
As streiff's excellent diary makes clear, the charge that disbanding the Iraqi Army was a per se boneheaded move doesn't stand up under scrutiny. In fact, once analyzed and weighed thoughtfully, as streiff did here, IMO it's literally impossible to claim honestly that only a fool would have disbanded the Iraqi Army. But , those who use this allegation--and many, many others like it--to weaken the Bush Administration and the war effort won't stand and debate the assertion's merits. Why do that, when there are so many other allegations to throw instead. If this one didn't draw blood...well, maybe one of the others will. Why stick around to play a losing hand?
Sadly, streiff is doing the thing that we who support the war effort in Iraq must all do: Refute the charges as they come up, one by one, in detail, again and again. As streiff pointed out, Mark Bowden, Dan Senor and others have refuted this particular charge in detail. Yet it persists, albeit in diminshed form. And we should expect it will persist.
I hope the Bush Administration takes Bill Kristol's suggestion. Go recruit some of the well-trained, battle-ready conservative talent at Heritage and other places. See if Peggy Noonan or Mary Matalin or some other good GOP talking heads will sign up for a year or two to help the administrations' PR effort on Iraq. Turn them all into a Truth Squad, who will hunt down and refute these charges as they pop up.
Openly ridicule a MSM agency that prints an unsubstantiated charge, or badly twists the administrations' words out of context. Have Scott McClellan call out a news agency, in a White House press briefing, when they cross the line. Publicly challenge Dem leaders again and again and again to come up with a specific, point-by-point countering option for what to do in Iraq. Then, the next time Howard Dean says, as the Dems are not in power now, it's not their responsibility to come up with solutions, ridicule him unmercilessly. Mr. President, hire a Truth Squad to do the dirty work for you, so you can focus on Iraq, Social Security reform, etc... Or, run the risk that the Dem strategy will work, and you'll be bogged down until your last term in office expires.
As for me, I'm working on some opinion pieces for my local newspaper supporting the President on Iraq. (I actually think one or two might get printed!) Those of us who support the President in Iraq, who are concerned about the endless drumbeat of negativity on our troops' and nations morale, can help out by making our own noise. Leters to the editor. Letters and phone calls to Congressmen and Senators. Phone calls to radio talk shows.
The Dems and ChimpyMcBushitler haters won't listen to what we have to say, so don't try to persuade them. Talk to those in our country who are undecided, who are unsure. who, if they turn against the war, could really imperil our prospects for victory.
Even if you have to convey a message that has been told already, many times. As streiff did here, with excellence.
Not bad for an old infantryman.
Excellent topic, citations and analysis of another lefty myth. Add this one to the ash heap of lefty gripes along with: "we didn't have enough troops.." (I guess in spite of the most rapid and successful military campaign the world has ever seen with another division we would have taken down Iraq 24 hrs sooner?). Or "the secular Saddam and the pure, holy warrior Osama would never do business and there could never be a connection between Iraq and Al qaeda..." (I guess other than NPR, NYT and Washington Post all reasonable people don't buy this clever sophistry concerning their purist principles that would have excluded cooperation.) Or how we previously financed and supported both Saddam and Osama... The Michael Moore list goes on and on...
From the standpoint of simple unit cohesion, tactical effectiveness and so many other fundamental military principles (I'd think Gen Zinni would have obtained some these along with simple common sense during his military career), the flaws of keeping in tact Saddam's army with the idea that they would turn their guns around is preposterous on its face. Morally, it's absolutely repugnant to welcome to our side these former agents of terror and oppression, but militarily it would have been absolutely disastrous and they would have been more trouble than they were worth (they are better enemies than allies). They would have been completely compromised with Sunni terrorists, still loyal to their lost cause, funneling intel and supplies to their terrorist allies and absolutely untrustworthy in any level (other than say using these goons to secure a Shiite neighborhood, and can you imagine the message that would send?!).
Had we gone down such a foolhardy road, I predict even the NYT-Washington Post crowd and other anti war lefties would see what folly such an act would be and with their perfected righteous indignation would use it as another stick to attempt to daily poke in the eye of Presdt Bush. It would have been an Abu Ghraib style field day for left to sharpshoot the Presdt (and rightly so in this case) over such a morally bankrupt approach of using these goons as well as the strategical and tactical military folly. Granted the left is weak on both moral and military principles, but even they would have figured this one out and I can see the "boy genius" Wesley Clark pontificating about how he would have never allowed this...
Another thing the Liberals ignore is the cost of delaying. There were powerful arguments against leaving Saddam in power, including his aggressive warfare, his mass murder of Iraqi civilians, and his use of WMD, all extremely well documented before the start of hostilities.
Under the UN sanctions after Gulf I, Saddam was obligated to reveal and assist the UN in eliminating Iraq's WMD; neither the UN nor the USA were obligated to expend effort to find or destroy these WMD. Regardless, after thirteen years and much effort, the WMD were (and are) still unaccounted for.
The UN sanctions regime had remained rock-solid through these thirteen years and seventeen UNSC Resolutions. It is now known that France and Russia, as a minimum, were playing a double game, taking Saddam's bribes and supporting Saddam with diplomatic efforts and military hardware, while voting for useless UN Resolutions; it was not recognized that the UN votes were a great sham until these UN Security council members unilaterally repudiated their support for Resolution 1441. At which time the leftists and Liberals accused the USA of unilateralism!
Every decision and non-decision has advantages and disadvantages. In 2002, we had the experience of 09/11 and of Saddam's terror and dishonesty, and it was time to move, whether or not there were perfect knowledge or perfect plans. The potential costs of more terror events were greater than the cost of destroying the terror masters. Current estimates of the cost of 09/11 are now in the trillion dollar range, while we have only just recently passed the $200 billion mark in the War against the Terrorists. Another major attack, particularly with nuclear or biological weapons, could easily surpass all costs to date.
No one to the right of Ramsey Clark had serious complaints about the first three weeks of the Iraqi War; the complaints developed over time with the rise of the terrorists, compounded particularly by the foreign al-Qa'eda infiltrators, primarily through Syria, another terrorist regime. The argument that Coalition actions in Iraq are creating terrorists is silly in the extreme, as if Beirut, the Embassy bombings, the USS Cole, and 09/11 had never happened. And where would one prefer to fight with terrorists than in Iraq? New York City? Been there, done that, twice. It is much to our benefit and advantage that the terrorists have decided to make a stand in Iraq, in preference to virtually any other place on the globe.
Now every Liberal ideologue with an agenda is stumbling around trying to find any reason possible to argue that we should not have gone into Iraq, or we should have done it differently, or we should have waited - for what, another attack against the USA?
The decision to disband the army certainly had costs, but the critics too easily gloss over the greater costs of keeping the army, as well as ignoring the criticisms they would have made of that decision (i.e., that our commitment to democratizing Iraq was a sham as shown by keeping the Old Guard in place).
I have always thought the notion of keeping the Iraqi military in place seemed like a bad idea, and have been a bit mystified by those supporting that tactic. A good post.
There are many things we should have done better, and sooner -- inclucing having elections, trying Saddam for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, and rebuilding the infrastructure of Iraq (which remains long overdue, not yet even back to pre-war levels -- though admittedly this takes time and lots of money). But disbanding the army was not, I don't think, an error; we would now probably be facing a massive Shiia insurgency, which would make the current situation look like a cakewalk.
On June 23, 2003, Bremer rescinded that portion of his order and salaries resumed to all members of the regular army. Conscripts received their one-time severance payment and were released from service.
How long did the members of the regular army stay on salary?
And doesn't this say that conscripts were released? Doesn't that mean they were out of a job?
The horrific suffering and death caused by the sanctions should have been discussed, before the invasion, as another reason for the war. (Recalling Madeline Albright's infamous line "we think the price is worth it" about 500,000 Iraqi children killed by the sanctions.) The only time I recall mention of the sanctions was by Fareed Zakaria in Newsweek, who pointed out that even if we killed 20,000 people in the war, that would still be less than we are killing now with the sanctions. Running a "cost-benefit-analysis" with human lives is somewhat disgusting, but it must be discussed when human lives are at stake and we must choose the least murderous option.
The potential costs of more terror events were greater than the cost of destroying the terror masters . . . Now every Liberal ideologue with an agenda is stumbling around trying to find any reason possible to argue that we should not have gone into Iraq, or we should have done it differently, or we should have waited - for what, another attack against the USA?
I'm confused, since this post is about Iraq; are you asserting that Saddam was connected to 9/11?
Also, there are many centrist/moderate people who believe we should not have gone into Iraq -- even many conservatives and Republicans; but we say "it doesn't matter how we got there, we are there, so what do we do NOW?"
The argument that Coalition actions in Iraq are creating terrorists is silly in the extreme, as if Beirut, the Embassy bombings, the USS Cole, and 09/11 had never happened
The argument isn't that there were no terrorists prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq (at least I've never heard that argument made). The argument -- which is fairly straight-forward common sense, I think -- is that when you bomb a country preemptively without credible pretext and then occupy that country -- particularly a White Western Christian (broadly-speaking) country invading and occupying an Arab Eastern Muslim (broadly-speaking) country, as Bin Laden warned about . . . It is not, as they say, rocket science. By invading Iraq in this way, we have essentially confirmed for millions of Arabs and Muslims exactly what Bin Laden has been saying for years; it's been a great recruiting tool for Al Qaeda. And these arguments were not suddenly invented long after the war; these arguments were made repeatedly by many people prior to the invasion. The media did not discuss it, granted, but it was known well in advance by most honest/serious people that the likely consequences of the war would be 1.) an increase in proliferation of WMD (which the U.S. has shown to be the only possible deterrent to a U.S. attack) and 2.) an increase in terrorism.
(The short version: when you are threatened or attacked, you tend to fight back -- like the U.S. did after 9/11.)
Aside from encouraging nuclear proliferation, the other major drawback to the doctrine of preemption, of course, is that it can only succeed if applied in an ad hoc or selective manner -- that is, we can do it, but no one else is allowed to. For example, according to the doctrine of preemption, North Korea would be justified in attacking the U.S. And right this very moment, Iran and Syria are justified in attacking the U.S., according to the doctrine of preemption.
Another drawback to the doctrine is that it is illegal under international law and undermines the U.N. -- which is very important, because if the U.S. essentially exclude itself from the international community of law-abiding nations, it then becomes the "Rogue State" -- which has its advantages, I grant you, such as that it is feared and can threaten people -- but I'm not sure this outweighs the disadvantages. Such as, without the U.N. there would be no U.N. resolutions, which were used to justify the war! (Everyone likes to bring up the U.N. resolutions -- but only with regard to Iraq, of course, never with regard to Israel, or Cuba; and seldom, either, bringing up the resolutions calling for sanctions to cease upon Iraq's disarmament -- which Clinton decided to unilaterally ignore/overrule.)
Lastly,
No one to the right of Ramsey Clark had serious complaints about the first three weeks of the Iraqi War
I'm not sure if I understand this statement, but I presume you mean how the war was going, the military strategy/success, etc. (rather than the millions and millions of people who were completely appalled and terrified by the massive bombing campaign, which was launched illegally). The thing is, it was never in question that the largest military machine in the history of the world would smash this devastated, disarmed and defenseless little country quite easily if it relied on its air power (which it did). But I think even more people would have had "complaints" -- not simply "liberals" and "lefties" -- if the media had shown them not just the video-game special effects laser light show of the bombing, but also the death, dismemberment and misery caused by that bombing. Or even without showing it, the MSM could simply have reported how many thousands of people had been killed (I've read that several thousand were killed in one day shortly before the U.S. famously pulled down Saddam's statue, and this shocked me because I head never heard it reported). They could have reported about the napalm, cluster bombs, and depleted uranium that were used (and now the White Phosphorous story is coming out -- why only now?), and let people use their imaginations -- I would consider that very "conservative" reporting (just the facts, no emotional appeals).
They could also have reported (pretty much starting the first day of the invasion) every single day that no nuclear, chemical or biological weapons had been used against U.S./coalition troops -- which, of course, would make us all breathe a heavy sigh of relief, but might also have led to "complaints" about the truthfulness of the stated reasons for the war.
I think if the MSM had done their job properly before and during the war, most people would have known better long ago. Because of the MSM, for a long while between 50-60% of Americans believed that Saddam was responsible for 9/11; also about half believed until not that long ago that WMDs were found in Iraq. Doesn't this show that instead of questioning the government, holding it's feet to the fire and reporting the truth, the MSM has simply been a mouthpiece uncritically parroting the government's claims?
Sorry this was so long, there's so much to say about this topic . . .
I'm confused ...
Well, you got that part right, at least.
the conscripts wanted to be "out of a job." Generally, conscripts everywhere want to be "out of a job", that's why they are conscripts.
The army is still on salary and will remain on salary until the government that will be elected in December replaces the transitional national law promulgated under Bremer with a new national law.
from the netherworld. Well, you are banished again.
So much for free speech.
First off, this is not directed at every member/reader/participant at RedState, or even most of you (I'm sure most of you are fine people). This is directed at the Political Correctness Dictators (moderators) who rule it:
This is perhaps the most UnAmerican site I have yet encountered (aside from "FreeRepublic" -- which should really be called "EnslavedMonarchy"). I cannot think of anything more antithetical to what America stands for than banishing people simply because they articulate views that you disagree with. You might consider changing your site name to "AmericanMadrassa" or "AmericanPravda.com" -- it would be more accurate.
I'm not arguing that those who own/operate this site are not entitled to be as dogmatic and anti-democratic and anti-free-speech as they like -- it's free enterprise, you can do what you want. What is repulsive is that this is how you choose to operate -- simply purge any critics, so we can all repeat the same rhetoric and the same talking points over and over again and reinforce our preconceived beliefs rather than having to actually think. Why? If you voice the party line, you are welcome; if you deviate from it, you are banned. Stalin would be proud. If you had any shame, the utter hypocrisy and cowardice would shame you.
Let's hope that no one in Iraq uses this site as an example of what free speech is supposed to be, or every Iraqi web site will probably ban all Americans and non-Muslims.
(And by the way, don't even bother trying to justify this according to your "posting rules" -- that's a farce and you know it. The only possible reason might be that this comment strayed from the topic of the main post. But it addressed [and was a reply to] a comment that strayed from the topic, and this person was not banned. Similarly, this person was not banned. Why? [It's a rhetorical question, of course.] People violate the "rules" every minute and you couldn't care less, as long as they're "attacking, harassing, or demonizing" the right person -- i.e., a "lefty" or someone you disagree with. But apparently you've determined that the best way to maintain "civility even in disagreement" is to just permanently gag any person who disagrees; well, that's one way to do it.)
I frequently hear right-wingers parrot the notion that "we are the party of ideas," "the other side has nothing to say," "all lefties do is call names," etc. etc. Well, your Stalinist tactics betray this utter lie; maybe you should actually listen instead of trying to silence people.
This will be my last post (assuming you are not about to have an epiphany about the value of free speech anytime soon), so no need to ban me again. I'm sure most RS members could not care less, and will bid me "good riddance." But if there are some of you reading this who actually believe in free speech/expression, dissent, discussion/debate, open-mindedness, etc.; could you perhaps recommend an alternative -- an American -- site for me -- one in which people of varying political stripes seek to further knowledge and understanding by actually engaging each other in open and honest debate; where the goal is to reach the truth and arrive at some consensus? (DailyKos -- while it is certainly far more American than this site, as it does not ban people for no reason -- suffers from the same flaw of being largely one-sided and not debate-oriented.) Thanks. Do that for me, and I will be happy to never return, and leave those who prefer to live life with blinders on to remain here with their happy little heads in the sand.
What he will tell his Kos budddies.
I frequently hear right-wingers parrot the notion that "we are the party of ideas," "the other side has nothing to say," "all lefties do is call names," etc. etc.
What he really said.
Thanks, Mein Fuhrer - Political Correctness Dictators - AmericanMadrassa-AmericanPravda.com-anti-democratic -anti-free-speech-Stalin would be proud- utter hypocrisy and cowardice -Stalinist tactics betray this utter lie-happy little heads in the sand
disbanding the Gestapo? or drawing the Kaiser's Army down to 100,000? Hell, the people saying what jackasses we were for disbanding it are probably the same people who had clamored for us disbanding the CIA, FBI and probably the US Army at one time. No, I take the last part back about the US Army, always need a few around armed with spitballs.